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CONTRACTS - MUTUALITY- CONSIDERATION IN A "REQUIREMENTS" CoN-

TRACT-Plaintiff, a wholesale liquor distributor, and defendant entered into a
contract under which plaintiff agreed to place orders with defendant from time
to time for all such wines as it might require under labels bearing plaintiff's own
brand or trade name. Defendant agreed to £11 these orders for a period of sixteen
months, as well as orders for other wines bottled under labels not the exclusive
property of plaintiff. As to the latter types of wine, however, plaintiff was expressly
left free to purchase from others. When defendant refused to complete orders
pursuant to this agreement, plaintiff brought an action to recover for loss of profits.
Held, because plaintiff was embarking on a new business venture, with very indefinite needs, the contract lacked mutuality and was unenforceable. G. Loewus
& Co., Inc. v. Vischia, (N.J. 1949) 65 A. (2d) 604.
The word "requirements," when used in a contract of this nature, is often
ambiguous. It may mean that the buyer will take from this seller so much as he
orders, reserving full rights to purchase elsewhere, in which case the courts universally agree that the promise is illusory and the agreement unenforceable by
either party.1 On the other hand, a fair construction of the entire contract may
show, as in the principal case, that the buyer has limited himself to purchases of

12 In the principal case an effort was made by the dissenters to distinguish Central
Greyhound on the basis that the latter case only decided a prolonged controversy over the
taxability of the proceeds of interstate commerce. If this distinction is perpetuated, we may
expect that taxes levied on the gross receipts from interstate commerce will be permitted, but
taxes on interstate commerce, measured by the gross receipts, will be forbidden. Such regressive and unrealistic doctrine completely ignores the economic incidence of the tax.
13 One might reasonably infer from the concurrence of Justice Burton in the Memphis
Natural Gas Co. case that he would be included in this group.
1 GRISMORE, CONTRACTS

§57 (1947).
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a certain commodity from this particular seller and no other. Even so, many courts
are willing to call the promise sufficient consider~tion only if the future requirements of the buyer are reasonably ascertainable at the time the contract is executed.2 The usual statement is that established need supplies "mutuality."3 Again,
unfortunately, the term "mutuality" does not lend itself to precise definition. If
taken to mean, as is the usual case, that a promise not legally obligatory cannot
be a sufficient consideration, the position is clearly incorrect. Valid unilateral or
option contracts are in common business usage.4 If taken to mean there must be
a mutuality of undertaking or adequacy of consideration, the theory is likewise
untenable. The seller enters a "requirements" contract with full knowledge that
the buyer may never place an order. If he is willing to take this risk, there is no
reason why he should not be free to do so. He will be somewhat protected by the
modem doctrine of constructive conditions.5 It is submitted that the better reasoned authorities hold a "requirements" contract valid whenever, as in the principal case, the buyer agrees to take all of certain goods from the seller. 6 There
should be no added necessity of established need. The buyer's option is a limited
one, between buying of this particular seller and not buying at all. Either alternative is detrimental, the buyer having circumscribed his freedom of action. This is
the usual test of consideration in common law countries and leads to certainty in
business transactions.7

Robert W. Shadd, S.Ed.
2 This is sometimes called the "New York Rule." See Ferenczi v. The Natural Sulphur
Co., 11 N.J. Misc. 262, 166 A. 477 (1933), and cases therein cited. But, cf. Edison Blee.
Ill. Co. v. Thacher, 229 N.Y. 172, 128 N.E. 124 (1920).
3 A further distinction is often drawn between manufacturers and jobbers, it being said
that the latter's requirements are very seldom definite. ANsoN, CONTRACTS, Turck ed., §139
(1929).
4 The theory that any promise subject to the "will" of one of the contracting parties is
illusory has been termed an application of civil law doctrines which are contrary to the
Anglo-American idea of consideration. Patterson, "Illusory Promises and Promisors' Options,"
6 lowA L. BUL. 129 and 209 (1921). See also Pound, "Mechanical Jurisprudence," 8 CoL.
L. REv. 605 (1908) and GRISMORE, CoNTRACTS §68 (1947). But, cf. Harrison v. Cage, 5
Mod. 411, 87 Eng. Rep. 736 (1698) and 1 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTs §l03(e) (1931).
5 Patterson, "Illusory Promises and Promisors' Options," 6 lowA L. BUL. 129 and 209
at 225 (1921); GRISMORE, CONTRACTS §68 (1947).
6 Corbin, ''The Effect of Options on Consideration," 34 YALE L. J. 571 (1925); I PAGE,
CONTRACTS, 2nd ed., §§580-582 (1920); GRISMORE, CONTRACTS §57 (1947). For an
interesting application see E.G. Dailey Co. v. Clark Can Co., 128 Mich. 591, 87 N.W. 761
(1901), where it was held that the seller must continue to sell pursuant to the contract even
though the buyer had greatly increased his plant and his original requirements were infinitesimal when compared with his present requirements.
7 An annotation in 14 A.L.R. 1300 (1921) categorically states that in declaring on a
"requirements" contract, it is always necessary to allege (1) the business of the buyer, (2)
that such business is permanent, and (3) that the seller can predict the buyer's requirements
at the time the agreement is executed. That this position has been liberalized over the years,
if not altogether overthrown by a majority of courts, is clearly shown by the later supplementary
annotations in 24 A.L.R. 1352 (1923) and 74 A.L.R. 476 (1931).

